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PLATFORM WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE 
LABOUR ACTION IN THE MODERN ECONOMY 
Bethany Hastie* 
Introduction 
Work in the digital platform economy, such as for Uber, Lyft, Foodora, Door Dash, 
and other similar services, has given rise to substantial legal and scholarly attention in 
recent years. Like many other forms of work and employment, platform workers are 
often characterized as precarious. These workers face significant obstacles, both 
formal and practical, in accessing legal rights and protections related to their work. 
Scholars in general, and legal scholars in particular, have largely been preoccupied 
with the question of status or taxonomy for platform workers to date, unpacking and 
debating the question of whether platform workers are properly characterized as 
employees or independent contractors. While the question of taxonomy is important, 
as will be discussed in this article, it has largely deflected attention away from the 
multitude of strategies and avenues that platform workers can, and do, use to advance 
their labour interests regardless of their employment status. The current focus on 
taxonomy reveals a deeper concern for the challenges facing gig workers as workers, 
regardless of the status ascribed to them, and of the possibilities for innovative 
solutions to improve advance their interests beyond or outside of existing legislative 
regimes. While a variety of legislative and policy responses to regulating the platform 
economy have been explored,1 this article examines how platform workers are 
* Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. This research was
supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I wish to thank Mitchell
Horkoff for his research assistance on this article, as well as the editorial board of the University of New
Brunswick Law Journal, and the anonymous reviewers for this article, for their helpful feedback and
guidance.
1 For a broader discussion of various regulatory responses that fall both within and outside of the debate on 
classification, see e.g. Maria Mexi, “Social Dialogue and the Governance of the Digital Platform Economy: 
Understanding Challenges, Shaping Opportunities”, (Background paper for the ILO-AICESIS-CES 
Romania International Conference, 10-11 October 2019) at 7, online (pdf): International Labour 
Organization <www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---
dialogue/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_723431.pdf>, citing also: Molly Cohen & Arun 
Sundararajan, “Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy” (2015) 82 U Chicago 
L Rev Online 116; MaryAnne M Gobble, “Regulating Innovation in the New Economy” (2015) 58:2 
Research-Technology Management 62; Seth D Harris & Alan B Krueger, “A Proposal for Modernizing 
Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The ‘Independent Worker’” (December 2015), online (pdf): 
The Hamilton Project 
<www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger
_harris.pdf>;  Kristin Jesnes, “Employment Models of Platform Companies in Norway: A Distinctive 
Approach?” (2019) 9:S6 Nordic J Working Life Studies 53; Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & 
Adam Thierer, “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change” 
(2015) 8:2 J Bus Entrepreneurship & L 529; Stephen R Miller, “First Principles for Regulating the Sharing 
Economy” (2016) 53:1 Harv J on Legis 147; Sofia Ranchordas, “Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating 
Innovation in the Sharing Economy” (2015) 16:1 Minn J L Sci & Tech 413; Andrew Stewart & Jim Stanford, 
2020] PLATFORM WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE LABOUR ACTION 41 
engaging in various forms of collective labour action to directly advance their needs 
and interests outside of, or in furtherance of, formal regulation and response by 
government and business actors.  
This article surveys existing efforts by platform workers to collectively 
organize and advance their labour interests, with a view to improving their working 
rights and conditions. After reviewing the status of platform workers, the challenges 
and contours of their work, and the needs and interests that may be served through 
collective labour action in Section I, this article describes and comments on identified 
forms of collective labour action undertaken by platform workers across a number of 
jurisdictions in Section II. As this article discusses, collective labour action, in its many 
modalities, both formal and informal, creates a context in which the traditional legal 
debates regarding the status of the worker become less important, focusing instead on 
the actual needs, interests, rights and conditions of work at issue. Collective labour 
action, as a tool for improving workplace rights and conditions, as well as a political 
strategy, also creates greater space for the participation and voice of workers. The rich 
and diverse forms of collective labour action undertaken by platform workers provide 
both illustrations and lessons that can be drawn for workers in other precarious 
industries and jobs, and more broadly in considering the future of labour law in a 
modern economy increasingly characterized by work outside of traditional direct 
employment, a discussion taken up in Section III. This article thus sets a descriptive 
foundation for further dialogue on the future of labour law in the modern economy, 
both for platform workers and the many other, and growing, populations of workers 
falling outside of traditional labour and employment protections. 
I. Mapping the Landscape of Platform Work
Platform work has given rise to a substantial body of literature, litigation, and 
legislation, concerned with classifying platform workers for the purposes of labour 
and employment law. This debate has largely focused on determining whether workers 
are ‘employees’, and thus entitled to existing rights and protections afforded in 
domestic labour and employment law, or ‘independent contractors’ who fall outside 
the purview of legal regulation of employment.2 The implications of this question of 
status are clear; workers who are employees have the benefit of access to rights, such 
as minimum wage, and protections, such as in relation to health and safety, and against 
unjust dismissal. Workers who are not employees, but independent contractors, 
“Regulating Work in the Gig Economy: What Are the Options?” (2017) 28:3 Economic & Labour Relations 
Rev 420. 
2 See e.g. Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, “Uber, Taskrabbit, & Co.: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking 
the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork” (2016) 37:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 619; Guy Davidov, “The Status of 
Uber Drivers: A Purposive Approach” (2017) 6:1/2 Spanish Labour L & Employment Relations J 6; Robert 
Sprague, “Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: Trying to Fit Square Pegs into Round 
Holes” (2015) 31:1 ABA J Labor & Employment L 53; Abi Adams, Judith Freedman & Jeremias Prassl, 
“Rethinking Legal Taxonomies for the Gig Economy” (2018) 34:3 Oxford Rev Economic Policy 475; Emily 
C Atmore, “Killing the Goose That Laid the Golden Egg: Outdated Employment Laws Are Destroying the 
Gig Economy” (2017) 102:2 Minn L Rev 887. 
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receive no rights or protections under employment law and are thus required to 
negotiate their working conditions directly with their ‘clients’. The status question also 
relates directly to efforts to unionize amongst platform workers. 
Most jurisdictions, including Canada, historically developed legal tests to 
determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. These tests 
often look to a variety of factors with a view to ascertaining the extent of control 
exerted over the worker and their working conditions. Factors typically include: who 
owns the tools of the trade; whether the worker has a uniform; whether the worker can 
set their own schedule or hours of work; and, others.3 Platform work poses obvious 
challenges in attempting to use such factors as a basis for categorization. While 
platform workers typically “own the tools of the trade” (their vehicles or bicycles),4 
the extent of control that the companies may exert over working conditions, hours, 
future work prospects, and wages, is significant.5 As such, a nuanced application of 
historical employment tests under law produces a less-than-clear, and contestable, 
result for platform workers.  
Recent recognition of the growing number of workers in various industries 
who are neither clearly employees nor independent contractors has given way to new 
categories of workers, such as “dependent contractor”, in some jurisdictions. For 
example, Ontario recognizes the category of “dependent contractor”, which it defines 
as: “non-employment work relationships that exhibit a certain minimum economic 
3 In Canada, the leading authority is 671122 Ontario Ltd v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc, 2001 SCC 59, 
which summarizes the various tests and criteria historically adopted in Canada at paras 35–47. In California, 
the recent decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc v Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal (5th) 
903 (2018) rejected the historical Borello test used to determine whether workers were employees or 
independent contractors, which had, similar to the Canadian approach, emphasized the extent of control 
over working conditions, as well as other factors such as such as ownership of equipment, opportunity for 
profit and loss, and the belief of the parties. The California Supreme Court in Dynamex adopted a new “ABC 
test” that begins from a rebuttable presumption that the worker is an employee.  
4 But see Canadian Union of Postal Workers v Foodora Inc dba Foodora (2020), CanLII 16750 at paras 
92–99, 2020 CLLC 220-032 (OLRB) [Foodora], which characterizes the app (technology) as the essential 
tool of the trade, and which is owned and maintained by the enterprise. 
5 A number of jurisdictions are currently considering, or have already made judicial pronouncements, on 
this question. See Jeremias Prassl, Humans as a Service: The Promise and Perils of Work in the Gig 
Economy (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018) at 11; “Employment status of platform workers 
(national courts decisions overview—Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, 
Germany, Italy, Nederland, Panama, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States & Uruguay)” (8 
December 2018), online (blog): Una Mirada Crítica a Las Relaciones Laborales 
<ignasibeltran.com/2018/12/09/employment-status-of-platform-workers-national-courts-decisions-
overview-australia-brazil-chile-france-italy-united-kingdom-united-states-spain/> cited in Mexi, supra note 
1 at 6, n 4; Hilary Osborne, “Uber Loses Right to Classify UK Drivers as Self-Employed”, The Guardian 
(28 October 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/28/uber-uk-tribunal-self-
employed-status>. Conversely, relevant bodies in both US and Australia have declared Uber drivers to be 
independent contractors; see Daniel Wiessner, “Uber drivers are contractors, not employees, U.S. labor 
agency says”, Reuters (14 May 2019), online: <www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-contractors/uber-drivers-
are-contractors-not-employees-us-labor-agency-says-idUSKCN1SK2FY>; Paul Karp, “Uber drivers are 
not employees, Fair Work Ombudsman rules”, The Guardian (7 June 2019), online: 
<www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/07/uber-drivers-are-not-employees-fair-work-ombudsman-
rules>. 
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dependency, which may be demonstrated by complete or near-complete exclusivity.”6 
Recently, the Ontario Labour Board ruled that Foodora workers are dependent 
contractors, a category which, under the Ontario Labour Relations Act, extends with 
it a right to form a union and collectively bargain with the enterprise.7 These 
intermediary categories aim to reflect new forms of working relationships that are 
characterized by degrees of dependence and control, and yet over which workers also 
exercise control and autonomy. Despite these new categories, where they exist, issues 
remain in classifying platform workers. Overall, the question of employment status 
does not resolve the issues facing platform workers in relation to their labour rights 
and interests. 
As with many other forms of precarious work, workers in the platform 
economy are said to face varying levels of exploitation associated with their work. 
Concerns regarding wages, health and safety, and access to legal remedies are 
commonly documented.8 Scholars engaged in the classification debate largely see the 
solution to exploitation as expanding current legal definitions of employment to 
encompass platform workers. Some scholars have focused attention on the underlying 
normative criteria that employment tests might focus more substantially on, such as 
subordination,9 while other approaches have argued for the creation of intermediary 
categories between employee and independent contractor.10 Yet others have argued 
for a radical shift away from classification under employment law, advocating for the 
extension of a set of core rights and protections for all forms and modes of work.11  
The debate about status has likely been a focal point in existing scholarship 
precisely because of its assumed consequences in extending labour rights, as 
mentioned above. If platform workers are employees, they are subsumed under 
6 McKee v Reid’s Heritage Homes Ltd, 2009 ONCA 916 at para 30. 
7 Foodora, supra note 4 at paras 77–79. 
8 See e.g. Global Commission on the Future of Work, Work for a Brighter Future, ILO, (2019) at 44, cited 
in Mexi, supra note 1 at 1. See also Miriam A Cherry, “Beyond Misclassification: The Digital 
Transformation of Work” (2016) 37:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 577 [Cherry, “Digital Transformation”]; 
Miriam A Cherry, “People Analytics and Invisible Labor” (2016) 61:1 Saint Louis ULJ 1, cited in Mexi, 
supra note 1 at 9. 
9 See e.g. Emmanuel Dockès, “New trade union strategies for new forms of employment” (2019) 10:3 
European Labour LJ 219 at 221. 
10 See e.g. Seth Harris & Alan Krueger, “A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First Century 
Work: The ‘Independent Worker’” (December 2015), online (pdf): The Hamilton Project 
<www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger
_harris.pdf >; George A Green, “Employment Law and the Emerging Notion of The Dependent Contractor”, 
Mondaq (14 November 2018), online: <www.mondaq.com/canada/employee-rights-labour-
relations/754750/employment-law-and-the-emerging-notion-of-the-dependent-contractor>.  
11 Hugh Collins, “A Missed Opportunity of a Unified Test for Employment Status” (31 July 2018), online 
(blog): UK Labour Law <uklabourlawblog.com/2018/07/31/a-missed-opportunity-of-a-unified-test-for-
employment-status-hugh-collins/>; Cherry, “Digital Transformation”, supra note 8; Eva Grosheide & Mark 
Barenberg, “Minimum Fees for the Self-Employed: A European Response to the ‘Uber-ized' Economy?” 
(2016) 22:2 Colum J Eur L 193. 
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existing labour and employment legislation; if not, they fall wholly outside of it.12 Yet, 
regardless of their legal status, platform workers suffer from a lack of clear access to 
legal rights and protections, as well as from isolation, which may work independently 
and in concert to facilitate circumstances in which workers’ labour is exploited. The 
focus on status or taxonomy neglects to account for the difficulties in accessing rights 
in practice, even where they are extended on paper. 
This evidences an underlying core concern about the material working 
conditions of platform workers, regardless of their legally defined status.13 Indeed, the 
precariousness of working conditions for platform workers is increasingly 
documented, as are some of the negative consequences that can be associated with 
such work. While the debate concerning status has obvious merit and urgency, it has, 
in some way, deflected attention from a deeper discussion of the labour needs and 
interests of workers that might be served through alternative forms of collective labour 
action. 
Many of the features of platform work are simply a new instantiation of 
enduring labour precariousness: the casual or on-call nature of the working hours, 
minimal wages, lack of clear safety protections, and others.14 These reflect a general 
trend associated with neoliberalism away from standard employment, characterized by 
full-time permanent work, towards labour fragmentation and piece-work, facilitated 
through short-term contracts.15 This shift in the construction of labour markets is 
evidenced by the shedding of legal liability for labour and employment laws by 
enterprises, the transfer of risk from employer to worker, and often, consequential 
12 Though workers may still be covered by, for example, occupational health and safety regulations, anti-
discrimination law, and other related areas of law that regulate work and workplaces. 
13 Although status may be significant in determining, for example, formal access to unionization under 
domestic laws. See e.g. Mexi, supra note 1 at 6: “The right to collective bargaining for self-employed 
workers is the object of legal discussion, as it is often considered in breach of competition law by national 
antitrust authorities, given that this is considered "price fixing'' harming consumer welfare”, citing also 
Antonio Aloisi, “Negotiating the Digital Transformation of Work: Non-Standard Workers’ Voice, 
Collective Rights and Mobilisation Practices in the Platform Economy” (2019) European University 
Institute MWP Working Paper No 2019/03; Hannah Johnston & Christopher Land-Kazlauskas, “Organizing 
On-Demand: Representation, Voice, and Collective Bargaining in the Gig Economy” (2019) International 
Labour Organization Working Paper Conditions of Work and Employment Series No 94.  
14 See Stewart & Stanford, supra note 1 at 428–30; Mexi, supra note 1 at 1. Similar issues are noted for a 
growing number of workers falling outside of traditional direct-employment relationships; See Judy Fudge, 
Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, “Employee or Independent Contractor? Charting the Legal Significance of the 
Distinction in Canada” (2003) 10 CLELJ 193; Guy Davidov, “The Three Axes of Employment 
Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection” (2002) 52:4 UTLJ 357 [Davidov, 
“Characterization of Workers”]; Bethany Hastie, “Human Rights and Precarious Workplaces: A Comment 
on British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v Schrenk” (2019) 52:1 UBC L Rev 169 [Hastie, “Precarious 
Workplaces”]. 
15 Austin Zwick, “Welcome to the Gig Economy: Neoliberal Industrial Relations in the Case of Uber” (2018) 
83:4 GeoJournal 679. See also Jim Stanford, “The Resurgence of Gig Work: Historical and Theoretical 
Perspectives” (2017) 28:3 Economic & Labour Relations Rev 382.  
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economic benefits passed onto the consumer.16 These are each hallmarks of platform 
work, though they are not unique to this kind of work. 
Yet, there are features of platform work—or, at least, its representation—that 
are distinct in understanding the labour issues surrounding platform work, and which, 
in turn, produce distinct consequences for platform workers. The emphasis placed on 
technology—both in affirming and disruptive discourses about platform work—is of 
particular significance. Specifically, the role of the intermediary platform (or 
‘employer’) has been especially obfuscated. This obfuscation is an essential 
component to the financial success of the platform economy and, relatedly, to the 
illusion of its operation outside of the bounds of labour law.17 The technological core 
of platform work is presented as merely a passive instrument through which workers 
can connect directly with their clients, or purchasers of goods.18 As a result, the 
technological core of platform work operates in a distinct way to obscure the very 
existence of the work as regulated labour, to the benefit of the enterprise (or 
‘employer’) and, arguably, consumer.  
As existing scholarship has demonstrated, technology in this arena further 
functions to solidify aspects of precariousness of platform work.19 In particular, 
technology both enables greater surveillance of workers, while also isolating them, 
each of which entrenches precariousness in specific ways. The level of flexibility and 
freedom offered for work available through digital platforms is often cited as a draw 
for platform workers. However, “technology, in fact, acts more as an enabler of 
management than an emancipator” in these contexts.20 For example, the extent to 
which platform-based work enables surveillance and tracking activities, such as in 
relation to acceptance rates, has been noted as a cause of distinct stress for platform 
workers as compared with more traditional forms of employment or work.21 This 
entrenches the precariousness of the work both through the minute tracking of worker 
activities and through the consequential stress and negative impact on well-being to 
workers. 
Technology further functions in the context of platform work to create an 
acutely isolated and autonomous labour pool. The nature of platform work is such that 
16 Zwick, supra note 15 at 681–82. 
17 Mark Freedland, “New Trade Union Strategies for New Forms of Employment - A Brief Analytical and 
Normative Foreword” (2019) 10:3 European Labour LJ 179 at 181–82. See also Ian Fitzgerald, Jane Hardy 
& Miguel Martinez Lucio, “The Internet, Employment and Polish Migrant Workers: Communication, 
Activism and Competition in the New Oganisational Spaces” (2012) 27:2 New Technology, Work & 
Employment 93, cited in Mexi, supra note 1 at 9. 
18 Stanford, supra note 15. 
19 See e.g. Prassl, supra note 5. 
20 Nicola Countouris, Valerio De Stefano & Mark Freedland, “Preface to the ELLJ Special Issue: ‘Testing 
the “Person Work” Relation: New Trade Union Strategies for New Forms of Employment” (2019) 10:3 
European Labour LJ 175 at 176. 
21 Uttam Bajwa et al, “The Health of Workers in the Global Gig Economy” (2018) 14:124 Globalization & 
Health 1.  
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the work takes place in unfixed locations, during inconsistent times, with little or no 
physical workspace or opportunity to interact with other workers or with the company 
they work for.22 While the independence and flexibility associated with these 
characteristics of platform work is often cited as a benefit or advantage of this form of 
work,23 the resulting social isolation can negatively impact a worker’s sense of well-
being. Moreover, the extent of isolation and fragmentation of this workforce affects 
access to important avenues through which they might mediate their working 
relationship, interests and concerns. Without the opportunity for interaction with 
similarly situated individuals (other workers), platform workers do not benefit from 
clear or direct access points to seek advice on problems associated with their tasks or 
working conditions, or to gather information about their legal rights and protections.24 
Further, without clear communication channels to other workers, platform workers are 
inhibited from collectivization and collaboration.25 This poses a unique challenge for 
platform workers, as collective labour action has historically been seen as an important 
tool through which workers can advance their interests.  
Collective action, in particular, can provide platform workers, as it does with 
other workers, an avenue through which they can work towards materially improving 
their working conditions and interests. This may include items such as working hours, 
wages, surveillance and tracking systems, expectations concerning acceptance rates, 
health and safety conditions, and others. Importantly, collective action provides a 
means through which to raise awareness of and directly bargain about such conditions, 
potentially regardless of employment status, allowing platform workers to move past 
the status debate in order to advance their labour interests directly. The next section 
takes up a direct examination of forms of collective labour action that platform workers 
have engaged in, with a view to understanding the promise and potential of collective 
labour action in furthering the interests and needs of platform workers outside of the 
confines of existing labour and employment law regimes. 
II. Collective Action and Labour Organizing Among Platform Workers
Despite the noted difficulties and barriers that platform workers face, as discussed in 
the previous section, a growing number of case studies illustrate the innovative 
approaches workers are using to collectively organize and advance their labour 
22 See e.g. Mexi, supra note 1 at 9. 
23 See e.g. Elise Taylor, Isolated with Friends: Online Communities in the Gig Economy (Masters 
Dissertation, Northeastern Illinois University, 2017) [unpublished] at 15. 
24 Juliet Webster, “Microworkers of the Gig Economy: Separate and Precarious” (2016) 25:3 New Labor 
Forum 56. 
25 See e.g. Alex Wood, Vili Lehdonvirta & Mark Graham, “Workers of the Internet Unite? Online Freelancer 
Organization Among Remote Gig Economy Workers in Six Asian and African Countries” (2018) 33:2 New 
Technology, Work & Employment 95 at 97–98. 
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interests outside of formal unionization,26 and the promise that such approaches may 
hold in that regard. This section outlines and describes various approaches to collective 
labour action that platform workers have used, and how these may provide effective 
avenues through which to respond to the issues, needs and challenges they face. These 
include informal collectivization through the creation and proliferation of 
communication channels, union affiliation, union creation, cooperative ownership, 
and localized legislative responses.  
In its most informal instantiation, collective labour action by platform 
workers has included the creation and use of communication channels as a means to 
connect with other workers, as well as public protests as a vehicle through which to 
convey a shared message to a broader audience.  Public protests and demonstrations 
can function as a platform for workers to advance their labour interests, and increase 
the visibility of the workforce and the ongoing issues it faces. For example, numerous 
large-scale protests by Indonesian app-based drivers during 2016-2017 resulted in 
widespread media attention and invitation to talks with both legislators and 
companies.27 Similarly, app-based couriers in Italy engaged in large-scale protests 
against Foodora in an effort to improve the wage structure associated with their work.28 
Workers have further organized strikes and boycotts in the delivery sector, such as 
through “logging out en masse from apps that allocate work shifts”.29  
Platform workers have also created and utilized communication channels as 
a vehicle for internal discussion, dialogue and collaboration. These channels, also 
called “mass self-communication networks”,30 provide workers with an important 
avenue through which to connect with other workers, discuss dissatisfaction with their 
employer and working conditions, and brainstorm solutions for the future.31 
Communication channels can also be used to externally advocate for better conditions 
directly with consumers. In the United States, “Turkopticon, an online community of 
26 Access to which will be shaped directly by whether such workers are understood as employees or 
independent contractors, and by the statutory language defining application of the relevant legislation, as 
discussed in section I. 
27 Michele Ford & Vivian Honan, “The Limits of Mutual Aid: Emerging Forms of Collectivity Among App-
based Transport Workers in Indonesia” (2019) 61:4 J Industrial Relations 528 at 541. 
28 Arianna Tassinari & Vincenzo Maccarrone, “The Mobilization of Gig Economy Couriers in Italy: Some 
Lessons for the Trade Union Movement” (2017) 23:3 Transfer 353. 
29 Mexi, supra note 1 at 11, citing Anthony Forsyth, “'Prova di Solidarietà': How Effectively are Unions and 
Emerging Collective Worker Representatives Responding to New Business Models in Australia and Italy?” 
(Paper for the 17th International Conference in Commemoration of Prof Marco Biagi, Modena, 18-20 March 
2019).  
30Alex Wood, “Networks of Injustice and Worker Mobilisation at Walmart” (2015) 46:4 Industrial Relations 
J 259. 
31 Ibid. See also Kurt Vandaele, “Will trade unions survive in the platform economy? Emerging patterns 
of platform workers’ collective voice and representation in Europe” (2018) European Trade Union 
Institute Working Paper No 2018/05; Mexi, supra note 1 at 11, citing Michele Forlivesi, “Alla ricerca 
di tutele collettive per i lavoratori digitali: per i lavoratori digitali: organizzazione, rappresentanza, 
contrattazione [Looking for Collective Protection for Digital Workers: Organization, Representation, 
Bargaining]” (2018) 4:1 Labour & L Issues 35.  
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Mechanical Turk platform digiworkers, created a web platform called “Dynamo” that 
focuses specifically on building collective action”.32 Dynamo has engaged in a 
sustained campaign involving the publication of guidelines on fair pay, for example.33 
These forms of collective labour action can do some work to break down the 
barriers associated with isolation and fragmentation of this workforce, as discussed in 
the previous section. In particular, public protests and demonstrations function to 
connect workers with a broader audience or set of stakeholders, making visible a 
workforce that is largely rendered invisible through the discourse of consumerism that 
dominates the public sphere. The increased visibility, itself, is said to be a benefit 
regardless of whether such demonstrations effect material change in the short-term.34 
Relatedly, the creation and use of communication channels amongst workers provides 
the opportunity for interaction, problem-solving and advice-seeking in relation to their 
working conditions. Of particular importance with regards to the “self-communication 
networks”, these provide a means through which workers can “[boost] their 
associational power” and undertake further or more formal labour organizing with a 
view to advancing their labour interests.35 
Building on the foundation that may be created through communication 
networks and public demonstrations, platform workers in some cases have also 
directly engaged with trade unions in order to advance their labour interests. In some 
cases, workers are engaged with unions directly with the end-goal of formal 
unionization in mind. Unions are providing legal support for platform workers 
challenging their working conditions, employment status, and ability to formally 
organize a union, through litigation. For example, in Canada, ongoing legal disputes 
with Foodora and Uber are being supported by the Ontario Federation of Labour, as 
well as Canadian Union of Postal Workers.36 However, beyond this core role, unions 
are engaging with platform workers in a variety of informal ways. For example, in 
some cases, workers are engaged in “union-affiliated” relationships where established 
32 Mexi, supra note 1 at 11, citing Birgitta Bergvall-Kåreborn & Debra Howcroft, “Amazon Mechanical 
Turk and the Commodification of Labour” (2014) 29:3 New Technology, Work & Employment 213. 
33 Mexi, supra note 1 at 11, citing Niloufar Salehi et al, “We Are Dynamo: Overcoming Stalling and Friction 
in Collective Action for Crowd Workers” (Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 18-23 April 2015), online (pdf): Stanford 
University <hci.stanford.edu/publications/2015/dynamo/DynamoCHI2015.pdf>.  
34 Riccardo Emilio Chesta, Lorenzo Zamponi & Carlotta Caciagli, “Labour Activism and Social Movement 
Unionism in the Gig Economy. Food Delivery Workers Struggles in Italy” (2019) 12:3 Partecipazione e 
Conflitto 819.  
35 Vandaele, supra note 31 at 16. 
36 See “Union Presidents Support Gig Workers’ Fight for Employee Rights”, Canadian HR Reporter (8 
November 2019), online: <www.hrreporter.com/labour/news/union-presidents-support-gig-workers-fight-
for-employee-rights/322363> [“Gig Workers’ Fight for Employee Rights”]; “Unionizing The Gig 
Economy: Contractor Or Employee?” (7 November 2019), online: Fasken, The HR Space 
<www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/2019/11/hr-space-unionizing-the-gig-economy-independent-contractor-
or-employee/> [“Unionizing the Gig Economy”]. As mentioned in the previous section, Foodora workers 
have now been recognized as dependent contractors, enabling them to form a union under Ontario’s Labour 
Relations Act: Foodora, supra note 4. 
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unions are able to offer counselling and resources, as well as support for grassroots 
organization among platform workers.37 
In Europe, existing unions in several countries have made effort to adapt and 
extend their member-base to include platform workers.38 These have included 
inclusion of platform workers within existing collective agreements,39 partnerships 
with platform workers,40 as well as supporting the creation of websites for workers to 
“rate the working conditions of different platforms”, advocate for working conditions 
and wages, and connect workers with existing unions.41 For example, in Denmark, a 
first collective agreement on platform work was signed in 2018 between a platform 
for cleaning services, Hilfr, and Danish trade union 3F.42 That agreement introduces a 
new category of worker, “Super Hilfrs”, which attracts increased minimum hourly 
wages and allows workers to accrue rights to pensions, holiday, and sick pay.43 
Workers are eligible to become a “Super Hilfr” after 100 hours of work, and the regime 
is opt-out, meaning that workers will automatically be included unless they 
specifically object.44 
Established unions, with existing expertise and resources, offer an important 
support and avenue through which platform workers can collectively organize to 
advance their labour interests through both formal and informal channels. Such 
strategies are not new for unions, who have been increasingly present in similar ways 
in a number of precarious industries and with various populations of precarious 
workers. For example, a number of unions in Canada and internationally have been 
engaged, both formally and informally, with migrant workers in agriculture and other 
industries, supporting unionization as well as broader advocacy and support efforts for 
these workers.45 As formal unionization has declined across a number of labour sectors 
37 “Gig Workers’ Fight for Employee Rights”, supra note 36; “Unionizing the Gig Economy”, supra note 
36.  
38 See Mexi, supra note 1 at 13, citing Maarten Keune, “Trade Unions, Precarious Work and Dualisation in 
Europe” in Werner Eichhorst & Paul Marx, eds, Non-Standard Employment in Post-Industrial Labour 
Markets: An Occupational Perspective (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015) 378; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All (Paris: OECD, 2015). 
39 In the Italian logistics sector, for example. See Mexi, supra note 1 at 15. 
40 See e.g. Osborne, supra note 5. 
41 Mexi, supra note 1 at 13. 
42 Ibid at 15. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Regarding agricultural workers, see Bethany Hastie, “Renewing Labour’s Engagement with Old Forms 
of Precarity: A Case Study of Unionization of Migrant Agricultural Workers in British Columbia” (2019) 
49:1 Labour, Capital & Society 28; Tanya Basok & Ana Lopez-Sala, “Rights and Restrictions: Temporary 
Agricultural Migrants and Trade Unions’ Activism in Canada and Spain” (2016) 17:4 J Intl Migration & 
Integration 1271. For broader discussions concerning migrant workers and union revitalization, see e.g. 
Maite Tapia & Gabriella Alberti, “Social Movement Unionism: A Toolkit of Tactics or a Strategic 
Orientation? A Critical Assessment in the Field of Migrant Workers Campaigns” in Jurgen Grote & 
Claudius Wagemann, eds, Social Movements and Organized Labour: Passions and Interests (London, UK: 
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in past decades, these kinds of activities by trade union organizations are being 
documented and analyzed as a form of “union revitalisation” across a number of 
jurisdictions.46 
New unions and worker organizations are also being created across a variety 
of jurisdictions specifically for platform workers. For example, in Austria, Foodora 
workers created Betriebsrat with the support of an existing union, while in the United 
States, both Seattle and California have App-Based Drivers Associations.47 New 
guilds are further emerging in Europe, including “the Collectif Livreurs Autonomes 
de Paris, the German Deliverunion, the Italian Deliverance Milano, and the Dutch 
Riders Union with the aim to mobilize food couriers and Uber drivers, while also 
seeking to establish collective bargaining and social dialogue in the platform 
economy”.48 The creation of targeted associations and worker organizations can allow 
platform workers to connect with other workers, and provide a basis for targeted and 
concerted labour action, such as public awareness and advocacy campaigns, and direct 
bargaining for working conditions, applicability of legislation, and other significant 
topics. 
Some platform worker collectives are taking steps to compete directly with 
existing companies like Uber and Foodora through the creation of co-operative 
ownership models. Worker-owned enterprises allow platform workers to “share risks 
and benefits and negotiate better contracts, while being in a position to impact 
decision-making on how the platform is organized and managed”.49 The extent of 
control and direction that worker-owners may have under this model provides a clear 
avenue for improving labour conditions and interests. ‘Worker-owned’ platforms have 
surfaced in a variety of jurisdictions and contexts, including: Up & Go, a New York 
City-based home cleaning app designed and owned by immigrant Latin American 
workers; 50 Mensakas, a Barcelona-based delivery app started by two former Deliveroo 
drivers; 51 Eva, a Montreal-based Uber-like app that provides drivers with voting rights 
and shares in corporate profits;52 Fairmondo, a competition with Amazon and Ebay, 
Routledge, 2018); Richard Hyman & Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, “Resisting Labour Market Insecurity: 
Old and New Actors, Rivals or Allies?” (2017) 59:4 J Industrial Relations 538.  
46 Christian Lyhne Ibsen & Maite Tapia, “Trade Union Revitalisation: Where Are We Now? Where to 
Next?” (2017) 59:2 J Industrial Relations 170. 
47 Mexi, supra note 1 at 11–12. 
48 Ibid at 12.   
49 Ibid at 14 citing Trebor Scholz, “Platform Cooperativism vs. the Sharing Economy” (5 December 2014) 
online: Medium <medium.com/@trebors/platform-cooperativism-vs-the-sharing-economy-
2ea737f1b5ad>; Simel Esim & Waltteri Katajamaki, “Rediscovering Worker Cooperatives in a Changing 
World of Work” (2017) 1 IUSLabor 1. 
50 Ryan Hayes, “Worker-Owned Apps Are Trying to Fix the Gig Economy’s Exploitation” (19 November 
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which operates in Germany and the UK; 53 Fairbnb, an Airbnb alternative; 54 Green 
Taxi Cooperative, a competitor with Uber in Denver; 55 and, Loconomics, an Amazon 
Turk competitor in the US.56 
These models, termed “platform cooperativism”,57 provide an approach 
where workers’ rights may be better recognized and realized given the direct control 
workers have over the enterprise, and which may work towards fostering more 
sustainable and responsible commercialism.58 The worker-owned nature of such 
enterprises may provide a promising response to the rise of the gig economy 
monoliths,59 and importantly does so in a way that refocuses attention on the needs of 
workers. This may, in turn, do some work to mitigate the tendency to pit consumer 
interests against the needs of workers, a tactic commonly used to justify the suppressed 
working conditions of platform workers. It may further mitigate the obfuscation issue 
and its resulting consequences for workers, discussed in the previous section. Finally, 
the cooperative model may facilitate a greater sense of solidarity among platform 
workers.60 
Finally, localized legislative responses that address the root issues at play 
may provide concrete and material improvements for workers within that jurisdiction. 
The municipality of Bolonga, Italy, recently passed a “Charter of fundamental digital 
workers’ rights within an urban setting”.61 This Charter was the product of efforts by 
Riders Union Bologna, a group of platform delivery workers who formed this union. 
The Charter was signed by the city’s mayor, the Riders Union Bologna, two prominent 
Italian labour unions, and two food delivery platforms that, combined, employ 
approximately one third of food delivery riders in the city.62 The Charter prescribes a 
fixed rate for services meeting or exceeding the applicable minimum wage, as well as 
compensation for overtime, public holidays, bad weather, and insurance for accidents 
and illness.63 At a broader level, both California and the European Union have engaged 
in similar legislative responses, prescribing particular work conditions for platform 




57 Trebor Scholz, “Platform Cooperativism: Challenging the Corporate Sharing Economy” (2016), online 
(pdf): Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung <www.rosalux-nyc.org/wp-
content/files_mf/scholz_platformcoop_5.9.2016.pdf> [Scholz, “Challenging the Corporate Sharing 
Economy”]; Massimiliano Nicoli & Luca Paltrinieri, “Platform Cooperativism: Some Notes on the 
Becoming “Common” of the Firm” (2019) 118:4 South Atlantic Q 801 at 815–17. 
58 Scholz, “Challenging the Corporate Sharing Economy”, supra note 57. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Mexi, supra note 1 at 14. 
61 Ibid at 16. See also Chesta, Zamponi & Caciagli, supra note 34; Vandaele, supra note 31. 
62 Mexi, supra note 1 at 16.  
63 Ibid. 
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workers regardless of their status.64 Formal regulatory responses, as the Bologna 
example illustrates, are precipitated by collective action and advocacy that often 
includes multiple stakeholder groups, and is integrally related to other forms of 
mobilization and collective action discussed earlier in this section. In fact, the 
development of new local or national regulation of such work may be seen as a distinct 
output of the forms of collective action mentioned above, while also shaping further 
forms of collective action through its resulting content. 
Creative legislative approaches to addressing the labour needs, interests and 
challenges of platform workers outside of the confines of existing labour and 
employment law demonstrate the continued relevance and significance that extension 
of legal rights and protections on paper may have, and how these can be effected in a 
way that circumvents the lingering debate over employment status. Further, these 
legislative responses appear to include similar conditions and terms to those of 
negotiated collective agreements, such as the Danish example provided earlier in this 
section. The Bologna Charter is particularly interesting given the highly localized 
nature of the intervention, and potential for replication across municipalities in various 
jurisdictions.  
III. Platform Workers and Collective Labour Action: Lessons for the Modern
Economy
The previous section documented numerous examples of collective labour action by 
platform workers grouped into the following general categories: communication 
channels; union affiliation; union creation; platform cooperatives; and, legislative 
responses. These forms of collective labour action contain important implications for 
both platform workers and for workers in the modern economy more generally, which 
is increasingly characterized by a shift away from traditional employment 
relationships, and towards stratification and fissuring of the labour market.65 Most 
directly, each of the forms outlined in the previous section illustrates ways in which 
worker representation and voice can be advanced, and is being advanced, in a modern 
economy where formal employers and formal unionization are both in apparent 
decline. These forms demonstrate how collective labour action can advance core 
interests and needs of and for workers regardless of enduring issues surrounding status, 
which is posited to be of increasing concern for workers in a multitude of labour 
sectors.66 
64 EC, Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on 
transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union,  [2019] OJ, L186/105; US, AB 5, 
An act to amend Section 3351 of, and to add Section 2750.3 to, the Labor Code, and to amend Sections 
606.5 and 621 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, relating to employment, and making an appropriation 
therefor, 2019-20, Reg Sess, Cal, 2019.   
65 See e.g. David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be 
Done to Improve It (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Hastie, “Precarious Workplaces”, 
supra note 14. 
66 See e.g. Weil, supra note 65; Davidov, “Characterization of Workers”, supra note 14; Fudge, Tucker & 
Vosko, supra note 14; Hastie, “Precarious Workplaces”, supra note 14. 
2020] PLATFORM WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE LABOUR ACTION 53 
This section takes up an evaluation of the forms of collective labour action 
discussed in the previous section, with a view to understanding how they may function 
and be effective for both platform workers and other precarious workers in the modern 
economy. As discussed earlier in this article, these forms of collective labour action 
evidence innovative approaches to enduring labour law problems, both in overcoming 
obstacles associated with employment status, and in overcoming obstacles associated 
with practical access to rights regardless of status, as discussed in section I. As such, 
the forms of collective labour action being undertaken in relation to platform work 
have broader potential benefits for labour and the legal regulation of work in the 
modern economy. This section first contextualizes the broader contemporary labour 
landscape to which the benefits of the identified forms of collective labour action may 
attach. It then goes on to evaluate and discuss the identified forms of collective labour 
action from the previous section in relation to three key factors: representation of 
members and power vis-à-vis external actors; channels of participation; and, service 
alignment with member needs.67 
The modern economy is informed by many shifting paradigms, including 
globalization, automation, and the “fissured workplace”,68 which describes the 
abandonment of historical “direct employment” relationships and trend towards 
contracting-out discreet aspects of a business to external entities.69 This enables 
enterprises to maximize profits by shedding legal responsibility for workers, who are 
constructed as independent contractors, and also by transferring risk to those workers. 
Just as the rise of the standard employment relationship in the mid-20th century was 
motivated by the interests of capital-intensive enterprises, so too is the current shift 
away from standard employment motivated by the interests of enterprise, though in 
the opposite direction.70 
The current labour landscape is increasingly characterized by “non-standard” 
work.71 This label captures myriad forms of work that fall outside of the historical full-
time, permanent, direct-employment model. As such, “non-standard work” can 
include part-time and seasonal workers, casual and contract workers, employees and 
contractors. Alongside the growth in non-standard work is an increasing trend in the 
precariousness of such work.72 Precarious work is variably defined in existing 
scholarship, and often includes characteristics such as: instability and insecurity of 
employment; low wages; lack of benefits and entitlements; and, lack of control or 
67 Maite Tapia et al, “Responding to the Incongruences: Shifting Forms of Worker Representation” (Paper 
delivered at the CRIMT Conference “What Kind of Work for the Future”, Montreal, 25 October 2018) 
[unpublished].   
68 Weil, supra note 65. 
69 Ibid at 4.  
70 Stanford, supra note 15 at 390-91. 
71 See e.g. Davidov, “Characterization of Workers”, supra note 14. 
72 Hastie, “Precarious Workplaces”, supra note 14. 
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autonomy in the labour process.73 The consequences of precarious work often include 
an erosion of effective rights and protections under law, and in practice in the 
workplace.74 For a growing number of precarious workers, access to formal 
unionization, which could assist in ameliorating these issues, is also increasingly out 
of reach, either formally under law or in practice. This has, in turn, contributed to a 
general decline in unionization in the modern economy.75 
The increasing challenges of accessing formal and traditional models of 
unionization has resulted in a shift towards “embrac[ing] alternative forms of voice as 
a way to reach a broader set of worker identities and interests”76 pursued through 
informal agreements and extra-legal mechanisms with employers and related actors.77 
As existing scholarship has noted, access to formal unionization is increasingly out of 
reach for a growing number of workers, including platform workers.78 Thus, 
alternative forms of collective labour action, like those discussed in the previous 
section, “typically focus on service, advocacy, or organizing to improve the working 
and living conditions for employees rather than winning bargaining rights through 
bargaining unit elections”.79 
The previous section briefly commented on how each identified form of 
collective labour action works towards advancing platform workers’ labour interests. 
This section builds on those comments to examine in greater depth the function and 
effectiveness of each form of collective labour action, not only for platform workers, 
but more generally, given the noted shifts in the labour market within the modern 
economy. Specifically, this section develops and discusses the potential benefits of the 
identified forms of collective labour action in relation to three key criteria: 
representation of members and power vis-à-vis external actors; channels for 
participation; and, service alignment with member needs, drawing on the framework 
developed by Tapia et al.80 
73 Leah Vosko, ed, Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada 
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2006). See also Stephanie Procyk, Wayne Lewchuk & John 
Shields, eds, Precarious Employment: Causes, Consequences and Remedies (Halifax: Fernwood, 2017); 
Arne L Kalleberg & Steven P Vallas, “Probing Precarious Work: Theory, Research and Politics” in Arne L 
Kalleberg & Steven P Vallas, eds, Precarious Work (Bingley: Emerald, 2018) 1. 
74 Hastie, “Precarious Workplaces”, supra note 14; Weil, supra note 65 at 4; Davidov, “Characterization of 
Workers”, supra note 14. 
75 Tapia et al, supra note 67; Tapia & Ibsen, supra note 46; Hyman & Gumbrell-McCormick, supra note 
45. 
76 Tapia et al, supra note 67 at 1.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Tapia & Ibsen, supra note 46; Hyman & Gumbrell-McCormick, supra note 45. 
79 Tapia et al, supra note 67 at 2, citing Annette Bernhardt & Paul Osterman, “Organizing for Good Jobs: 
Recent Developments and New Challenges” (2017) 44:1 Work & Occupations 89. 
80 Tapia et al, supra note 67. 
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Tapia et al describe how scholarly inquiry has focused disparately on union 
revitalization or alternative worker representation forms, without sufficient attention 
to the overarching logics and considerations that explain why certain forms of worker 
representation exist and how they are situated within the economic and labour market 
landscape. The framework they develop moves forward from the siloed treatment of 
alternative representation forms to provide a “common framework with testable 
propositions about how incongruences are likely to lead to union restructuring or 
alternative forms of worker representation via the logic of membership and 
influence.”81 These logics, explained below, provide key indicators that can be used to 
assess the function and effectiveness of forms of collective labour action for workers 
in the modern economy. 
The logic of influence focuses attention on how powerful an intermediary 
organization or representation model is in its relationship with relevant external actors, 
such as an employer. In other words, it suggests that effective representation requires 
an intermediary, such as a union, that is “able to both represent and control workers 
credibly and effectively vis-à-vis external actors, such as employers and the 
government.”82 This logic examines the channels of representation, and mode and 
extent of control over workers, in order to determine the level of influence the 
intermediary has in relation to relevant external actors. This logic further examines 
these two factors in relation to the external environment in which the intermediary is 
operating. The “environment” is “a broad contextual factor that consists of the main 
elements outside the direct control” of the intermediary, such as “labor laws, political 
pressure, industry/organizational structures, and employer behavior”.83 Increasing 
congruency between representation and the environment, and control and the 
environment, work to increase the influence of the intermediary.84  
The logic of membership focuses attention on the internal dynamic between 
the intermediary organization or model and the workers or “membership base”. Under 
this logic, congruence between member identities and the factors of services and 
participation are key. The factor of services examines what “goods” the intermediary 
is able to provide to the membership base, such as collective agreements, legal advice 
or insurance, and how provided goods serve the interests of the constituency, having 
regard to their identities. “Greater congruence is achieved when services maximize the 
interest of the constituency”.85 Relatedly, channels of participation examines how the 
internal structure of the intermediary reflects the constituency’s identities and 
81 Ibid at 4. 
82 Ibid at 5. 
83 Ibid at 8. 
84 Ibid. See also Claus Offe & Helmut Wiesenthal, “Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes 
on Social Class and Organizational Form” (1980) 1 Political Power & Social Theory 67; Virginia 
Doellgast, Nathan Lillie & Valeria Pulignano, “From Dualization to Solidarity: Halting the Cycle of 
Precarity” in Virginia Doellgast, Nathan Lillie & Valeria Pulignano, eds, Reconstructing Solidarity: 
Labour Unions, Precarious Work, and the Politics of Institutional Change in Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018) 1. 
85 Tapia et al, supra note 67 at 6. 
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interests. Greater congruence here is achieved when “channels of participation 
maximize members’ feeling of empowerment”.86 
As with a growing number of works across disparate industries and 
occupations, platform workers face significant difficulty accessing traditional models 
of collective labour action unionization. The previous section discussed many other, 
and novel, strategies that are being employed in the context of platform work in order 
to facilitate collective labour action, including: the creation and proliferation of 
communication channels; union affiliation; union creation; cooperative ownership; 
and, localized legislative responses. Each of these forms of collective labour action are 
differently situated along the axes of the two logics described above: influence, and 
membership. The remainder of this section examines how these forms of collective 
labour action map onto these axes, having regard to the key factors of: representation 
and control (for the logic of influence), and services and participation (for the logic of 
membership). 
Representation as a criterion for evaluating new forms of collective labour 
action has particular import in the digital platform work context, and perhaps more 
broadly in articulating and explaining why an increasing number of workers find 
formal unionization inaccessible and inapplicable. The formal and narrow 
requirements attending legal regimes for formal unionization often operate to the 
practical (if not formal) exclusion of non-standard workers, geographically dispersed 
workers, and autonomous workers. Platform workers can be described as 
encompassing all of these characteristics (non-standard, geographically dispersed, 
autonomous/isolated work). Moreover, the increasing population of precarious 
workers may be variably characterized by one or more of these factors, particularly as 
concerns non-standard work. This makes representation of particular importance in 
considering and evaluating forms of collective labour action. The forms of collective 
labour action discussed in section II create channels of representation that do not 
depend on classification or status under employment law, a noted inhibitor to 
accessing formal unionization under existing labour law, and thus work towards 
greater congruency between representation and the environment in the context of 
platform work, and potentially for other precarious work contexts. 
The creation of new unions specifically for platform workers, particularly in 
jurisdictions that allow for more flexible models of unionization, such as in Europe, 
may be seen as promising avenues for increasing channels of representation and 
increasing the congruence between representation and the environment. This form of 
collective labour action, closely aligned to the dominant historical model of formal 
unionization, shows the potential for adapting existing labour law regimes in ways that 
ameliorate the limitations and constraints noted in respect of these channels of 
representation for platform workers and an increasing number of precarious workers 
more generally.87 Further, the bargaining power that this form of collective labour 
action may hold, as evidenced by the instrumental role of the Riders Union in creating 
86 Ibid at 6.  
87 See e.g. Tapia et al, supra note 67. 
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the Bologna Charter, for example, illustrates well the significance that congruence 
between representation and the environment can have in enabling influence vis-à-vis 
external actors and in effecting substantive change for worker-members. 
Beyond the adaptation or expansion of unions, co-operative ownership may 
best illustrate an alternative form of collective labour action that creates strong 
congruence between representation and the environment. Co-operative ownership 
models that enable broad-based participation by platform workers within the defined 
geographic area and labour market sector provide an interesting pathway forward in 
considering innovative solutions to an increasingly acute and potentially widespread 
problem. In addition, the relatively low cost of entry for these enterprises, facilitated 
in many ways by the technology that in other circumstances may function coercively, 
makes co-operative ownership models a viable option for platform workers uniquely 
as compared to other populations of workers. Further, given the direct-ownership 
model of co-ops, congruence between control and the environment may be more 
readily achieved, at least where this is mediated by a small number of worker-owners 
in a geographically defined space. More broadly, as a model for collective labour 
action, co-operative ownership may function vis-à-vis external governmental actors, 
and can work towards advancing labour interests for platform workers in the arena of 
law and policy. The extent to which co-operative ownership holds promise for broader 
populations of precarious workers, however, may remain uncertain. The low cost of 
entry to the market associated with online platforms is a significant advantage of this 
model in the context of platform work. However, as noted earlier, some enduring 
forms of precarious work, such as cleaning and domestic services, may transition to 
online platform models, creating options for worker-owned co-operative enterprises 
to transform such labour sectors. 
Public-facing communication channels, such as protests, boycotts and public 
awareness campaigns, may operate in weak ways to support channels of representation 
and create influence vis-à-vis external actors, particularly those outside of the 
historical employment relationship. These forms of collective labour action do some 
work to make visible the hidden and often obscured centrality of the worker and their 
labour in the platform economy. As such, these forms of collective labour action may 
assist workers in advancing their interests and effecting change through direct 
communication with external stakeholders, such as the consumer, enterprise, and 
regulatory actors. These channels can, in addition to identifying and communicating 
the interests to be advanced, further open channels for representation, as there are few, 
if any, barriers to inclusion and participation for workers. These communication 
channels are, however, informal and as such, the contributions provide a foundation 
to support representation and influence, and should largely be seen as supportive or 
secondary measures. This form of collective labour action is not unique to platform 
workers, and the previous section discussed ways in which union-affiliated activities, 
particularly, have engaged in similar public-facing communication channels and 
campaigns for agricultural workers, as an example, which is another population of 
precarious workers often rendered invisible and hidden. Such communication 
channels, again, can be important supportive measures for advocacy around workers’ 
rights, particularly where workers’ interests require ‘buy-in’ from external 
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stakeholders outside of the direct-employment relationship, such as from consumers 
and regulatory actors. 
Several forms of collective labour action discussed in the previous section 
illustrate well the ways in which service alignment and member participation 
positively influence internal dynamics, providing significant benefit or meaning for 
worker-members, separately from a consideration of influence vis-à-vis external 
actors. Services—what a form of collective labour action offers for its constituency or 
member base—is expanded in important ways for platform workers in the forms of 
collective labour action discussed in section II. Further, several of the identified forms 
of collective labour action discussed in the previous section provide meaningful 
channels for member participation. These attributes align with recent labour studies 
literature that examines how collective labour action, both including and beyond 
unionization, can hold benefits for workers beyond formal bargaining power and the 
negotiation of working conditions under a collective agreement.88  
Services in the form of resources and information can be an important tool 
for platform and other precarious workers who may lack clarity on their existing legal 
rights and status. Further, as discussed in section II, resources and information-sharing 
amongst workers, as facilitated through some forms of collective labour action, can 
assist workers in identifying common challenges and trends in their working 
relationships. This can both create a sense of community and belonging in its own 
right, combatting effects of social and geographic isolation inherent in platform work, 
and can also be used to form a foundation for further collective labour action that looks 
to influence external actors, such as the enterprise ‘employer’, government, or the 
general public, as discussed above. Various forms of collective action described earlier 
provide information and resource-sharing services, which may align with basic 
informational needs of workers, as well as providing a secondary benefit of 
networking and connection amongst workers, thus combating isolation and mitigating 
against the noted barriers to collective organizing amongst geographically dispersed 
and autonomous workforces. These benefits are readily extendable beyond platform 
workers. Similar channels for workers in various precarious and non-standard labour 
contexts may work to both enhance a sense of well-being and community, while also 
providing important information and resources on topics of interest, such as legal 
rights and entitlements. 
The union affiliation form of collective labour action discussed in section II, 
while not unique to engagement with platform workers, illustrates well how the trade 
union—as the historically dominant labour relations form—is further adapting its 
function and purpose to create better congruence between its membership and services. 
Beyond formally representing union members, engagement in broader advocacy and 
resource provision to non-union sectors and workers such as platform workers, and 
agricultural workers, can both assist a union in building a potential membership base 
for formal representation, and also reimagines the purpose of the trade union as 
advancing worker voice and interests more broadly. Like with the creation of unions 
88 See e.g. Tapia & Ibsen, supra note 46; Hyman & Gumbrell-McCormick, supra note 45. 
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for platform workers, this is a modest shift in form of collective labour action from the 
historical dominant model of formal unionization. Yet, it similarly evidences the 
potential of this existing core to adapt to a modern economy, including re-envisioning 
its function and purpose to advocate for decent work on behalf of all workers, and 
perhaps especially the growing number of precarious workers for whom formal 
representation under a trade union is inaccessible, as discussed earlier. 
In addition to service provision, evaluating forms of collective labour action 
asks about the internal dynamic fostered through participation of members. This 
criterion is clearly exemplified in many of the identified forms of collective labour 
action taken up by platform workers, as discussed in section II. Channels of 
participation should aim to “maximize members’ feeling of empowerment” and, 
possibly, sense of belonging within the collective.89 Given the fragmentation, 
geographical dispersion, and autonomous nature of platform work, as with many other 
forms of precarious labour, channels for member participation may be a particularly 
significant benefit of alternative forms of collective labour action. As discussed above, 
some of the identified forms, while focused on service provision, provide additional 
opportunity for member participation through networking as well as grassroots 
information sharing. This may foster a sense of empowerment and belonging, as well 
as a sense of community, amongst workers who are otherwise largely isolated.  
New union creation and co-operative ownership models, while creating more 
open channels of representation, are also grounded by worker participation at their 
core, enhancing the sense of empowerment and ownership workers will perceive, and 
hold, over their labour, as well as in relation to collective advocacy or bargaining 
efforts. Indeed, these forms of collective labour action may hold particular promise for 
addressing noted gaps for precarious workers in the modern economy given the extent 
to which they increase congruence between representation and environment, on the 
one hand, and between membership and participation on the other hand. However, as 
mentioned earlier, new union creation will be a viable option particularly in 
jurisdictions that enable flexible unionization models under law, notably in Europe. 
This makes this form of collective labour action weaker in jurisdictions like Canada, 
where difficulties in opening up the channels for representation under current law 
would remain. However, as discussed earlier, associational models outside of formal 
unionization may still hold relative influence in advocating and advancing the labour 
interests of workers to a broader set of stakeholders, such as consumers and regulatory 
actors. Relatedly, the promise of co-operative ownership models is constrained by the 
higher cost of entry to the market outside of online platform-based work, as discussed 
earlier. Nonetheless, where a sector of precarious labour may find ways to transition 
to platform-based work, such as with respect to a few examples concerning cleaning 
and domestic services set out earlier in this article, such a model may prove a viable 
form of collective labour action for workers. 
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Conclusion 
Digital platform work has captured much attention from legal and other scholars, 
policy makers, and others, in recent years. While this form of labour presents distinct 
challenges for regulation in the modern economy, it also reveals enduring challenges 
of and for labour law. Particularly, while distinct in some ways, platform work in many 
other ways mirrors and aligns with noted historical trends in relation to broader 
conceptions of precarious work that exist across a range of labour sectors and 
occupations. Much of the dialogue surrounding platform work to date has focused on 
resolving the question of employment status. However, as this article demonstrated, 
this focus has distracted attention from the deeper underlying questions about the 
function and effectiveness of labour and employment law more broadly and, again, for 
both platform workers and a wider population of precarious workers. 
The technology associated with platform work, coupled with the heightened 
attention on this form of precarious labour, has in some ways produced novel 
approaches to advancing labour interests for workers outside of the confines of 
existing labour and employment law regimes and taxonomies. These forms of 
collective labour action, as identified in this article, present interesting case studies 
from which to consider how alternative forms of collective labour action may hold 
some promise for labour, and its legal regulation, in a modern economy that is 
increasingly characterized by non-standard work and workers that fall outside of 
historical regulatory regimes. This article canvassed various forms of collective labour 
action identified in relation to platform workers, and commented on the various 
benefits and limitations associated with each form, having regard to the ways in which 
these forms open channels of representation, hold influence vis-à-vis external actors, 
create service alignment with member needs, and open channels for participation by 
members. As stated at the outset, the aim of this article is to provide a rich descriptive 
foundation of the identified forms of collective labour action, their benefits and 
limitations, in order to set the stage for further dialogue and examination of the future 
of labour (law) in the modern economy. 
